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1Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  African-American activists and eighteen black
members of the Louisiana state legislature of 1890 organized to defeat a bill requiring racial
segregation on railroads by trading votes with white Democrats on the issue of a state lottery. 
When the “equal, but separate” law passed, lawyer-editor Louis A. Martinet marshaled much of
the group to test the law’s constitutionality, hired white Reconstruction judge and popular
novelist Albion W. Tourge3e as the organization’s lawyer, and recruited Homer Plessy to board a
railroad car reserved for whites.  Arrested by arrangement with the railroad company, which
wished to avoid the expense of maintaining separate cars for patrons of each race, Plessy was
arraigned before Orleans Parish Criminal Court Judge John H. Ferguson. 
Tourge3e argued that  segregation contravened the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
because it was a “badge of servitude” intended not to separate the races -- black nurses could
travel with white employers -- but purely to emphasize blacks’ subordinate status.  It was also
arbitrary and unreasonable because it allowed mere railroad conductors to determine a person’s
race and because race had nothing to do with transportation.
After Judge Ferguson and the racist Louisiana Supreme Court rejected or sidestepped these
arguments, Tourge3e appealed to a U.S. Supreme Court undergoing unusual personnel turnover,
adding five new justices during the four years that Plessy was pending.  Different appointments
might have led to a different decision.  As it was, the Louisiana law was upheld, 7-1, with four of
the positive votes coming from members of the more racist political party, the Democrats.  
The arguments between justices Henry Billings Brown of Michigan for the majority and John
Marshall Harlan of Kentucky in dissent came down to three basic points: First, Brown thought
racial separation and social inequality natural, unalterable by statutory or constitutional law,
while former slaveholder Harlan pointed out that it was Louisiana law, not custom, that imposed
segregation here.  Stealing a phrase from Tourge3e’s brief, Harlan announced that “Our
Constitution is color-blind.”  Second, the justices disagreed on whether the separate car law had
an invidious purpose, the northerner denying it, but the southerner knowing better.  Third,
Brown ruled the legislature’s imposition of segregation “reasonable,” citing laws and lower
court decisions from other states that supported his position, but deliberately ignoring the fact
that nearly every northern state had passed laws prohibiting racial segregation in schools and
public accommodations.  In response, Harlan criticized “reasonableness” as merely another
name for a judge’s personal values, agreed with Tourge3e that the law was arbitrary, and
predicted that the Plessy decision would stimulate racial hatred and conflict.  Thus, the
disagreements between Brown and Harlan turned more on facts and armchair social psychology
than on precedent or public opinion.
The terms of the argument between Brown and Harlan insured that the campaign of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People to overturn Plessy, which eventuated in
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), would spotlight testimony by professional social
psychologists and focus on social facts. 
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